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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSUMER PnOTECTION-LOTrERIES: "BoNus BNNG"-THE GREAT
SAFEwAY LorrERY.-State ex rel. Schillberg v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
75 Wash. Dec. 2d 351, 450 P.2d 949 (1969).
Safeway Stores, Inc. conducted a promotional advertising game,
bonus bingo, to attract customers to their grocery stores in Snohomish
County. To win at bonus bingo, participants had to obtain a booklet
of game cards from any Safeway outlet, visit Safeway Stores to pick
up prize slip numbers for particular game cards, and present the
winning card to a Safeway Store manager to collect the prize. The
local Prosecuting Attorney, convinced that Safeway's promotion was
an illegal lottery,1 sued for declaratory judgment on the legality of
bonus bingo, and for an injunction to halt such advertising practices.
Two lottery elements, a distribution of money or property and chance,
were readily apparent in this promotion; the legal question before the
court was whether there was adequate consideration flowing from the
participants to the promoter.' The Washington Supreme Court held
that consideration was present; therefore, bonus bingo was a lottery,
a public nuisance, and subject to injunctive action. State ex rel.
Schillberg v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 351, 450 P.2d
949 (1969).
1. WAs. REv. CODE § 9.59.010 (1956):
A lottery is a scheme for the distribution of money or property by chance, among
persons who have paid or agreed to pay a valuable consideration for the chance,
whether it shall be called a lottery, raffle, gift enterprise, or by any other name,
and is hereby declared unlawful and a public nuisance.
Every person who shall contrive, propose or draw a lottery, or shall assist in con-
triving, proposing or drawing a lottery, shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state penitentiary for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars, or by both.
2. WAS r. R Ev. CODE § 7.48.200 (1957): "The remedies against a public nuisance are:
Indictment or information, a civil action, or abatement.'
In Safeway, the Prosecuting Attorney instituted a civil action asking that respondent
be required to cease and desist the allegedly illegal scheme. No penal sanction was asked
for or contemplated.
3. The court framed the question thus:
whether a member of the public who participates in bonus bingo as a player
seeking to win prize money, even though he pays no fee, buys no tickets, and
wagers no property, tangible or intangible, advances what in law would constitute
a consideration upon that chance to win a prize.




Historically, lotteries have been viewed with suspicion and distrust.
A report from England described the serious evils of lotteries in the
early 1800's thusly: 4
These included cases where people living in comfort and respect-
ability had been reduced by their speculations to "the most ab-
ject state of poverty and distress"; the cases of domestic quarrels,
assaults, and the ruin of family peace; fathers deserting their
families and falling into want and disgrace; mothers neglecting
their children, sometimes leaving them destitute; wives robbing
their husbands of the earnings of months and years; and the
pawning of clothing, beds and wedding rings in order to indulge
in speculation. "In other cases, children had robbed their parents,
servants their masters; suicides had been committed, and almost
every crime that can be imagined had been occasioned, either
directly or indirectly, through the baneful influence of lotteries."
The American reaction was similarly antagonistic.5 An early judicial
pronouncement stated6
Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are
comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-
spread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few
persons and places but the latter infests the whole community. It
enters every dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the
hard earnings of the poor; it plunders the ignorant and the
simple.
Washington State evidenced a corresponding displeasure with lot-
4. F. WiLLiAMs, FLEXIBmE PARTIcPATION LormuIs 5 (1938) [hereinafter cited as
WILLiAMs]. This book, with a 1956 supplement, is the only treatise on the subject of
lotteries, and presents an entertaining and informative history of lottery activity in the
United States.
5. In 1830 a member of the Pennsylvania legislature declared that:
the lottery destroys the happiness of the poor by its false hopes, draws them away
from labor and industry and leads to pauperism, misery and crime. As a means of
raising money it is worst imaginable.
7 McMASTER, HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE: OF TE U.S. 154, quoted in WILLAmS, supra note
4, at 6 n.6.
Mr. Williams himself reasoned that:
But though they [lotteries] supply a ready mode of replenishing the public treasury,
they have always been found to exact a mischievous influence upon the people. The
poor are invited by them rather than the rich. They are diverted from persistent
labor and patient thrift by the hope of sudden and splendid gains; and as it is the
professed principle of these schemes to withhold a large part of their receipts, a
necessary loss falls upon that class which can least afford to bear it.
WiLLiAMs, supra note 4, at 311.
6. Phaen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850).
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teries by inserting in the state constitution7 a provision which has been
broadly interpreted as a plain and simple ban against the conduct of
any lottery.' This constitutional provision has been reinforced by
specific anti-lottery legislation.9
To constitute a lottery in Washington, three elements must be
present; prize, chance and consideration."0 The Washington Court has
displayed a propensity to interpret broadly the requirement of "a
valuable consideration." In Society Theatre v. Seattle,1 plaintiff
theatre owner distributed, without charge, tickets for a grocery draw-
ing to all persons attending the theatre on a given night. The court held
that this type of promotion was a lottery, stating that:'
... while patrons may not pay, and the respondents may not re-
ceive any direct consideration, there is an indirect consideration
paid and received. The fact that prizes of more or less value are
to be distributed will attract persons to the theatre who would
not otherwise attend. In this manner those obtaining prizes pay
consideration for them, and the theatre reaps a direct financial
benefit.
In State v. Danz,"5 the court was confronted with a situation similar to
that in Society. Participants were not, however, obligated to purchase
theater seats in order to obtain tickets for the free groceries drawing.
The court, seeing no meaningful distinction between the cases, ex-
7. WAsir. COxS. art. II, § 24:
The legislature shall never authorize any lottery, or grant any divorce.
8. WASH. CoNsT. art. II, § 24 has been held to be "mandatory and • . • self execut-
ing." Seattle v. Chin Let, 19 Wash. 38, 40, 52 P. 324 (1898).
In State ex rel. Evans v. Brotherhood, 41 Wn. 2d 133, 145, 247 P.2d 787, 794 (1952)
the court held that slot machines in private clubs constituted a form of lottery. Com-
menting on art. II, § 24, the court stated:
we feel most strongly that the language of this constitutional provision is not
ambiguous. The provision is phrased in the broadest and most sweeping terms. It
prohibits any lottery. We believe the word 'any,' given its usual meaning, is all
embracing as far as different types and kinds of lottery schemes and devices are con-
cerned. Clearly, its meaning seems to us to be the equivalent of the terms of all
or every.
9. WAsH. Rxv. CODE § 9.59.010, supra note 1.
For a complete list of all state constitutional provisions, state and federal statutes for-
bidding or severely restricting lotteries see 2 GA. L. R!v. 132, 133 n.5 (1967).
10. Society Theatre v. Seattle, 118 Wash. 258, 260, 203 P. 21, 22 (1922).
A lottery is defined in WASH. Rxv. CODE § 9.59.010, supra note 1, as a "scheme for
the distribution of money or property by chance, among persons who have paid or
agreed to pay a valuable consideration for the chance ... .
11. 118 Wash. 258, 203 P. 21 (1922).
12. Id. at 260, 203 P. at 22.
13. 140 Wash. 546, 250 P. 37 (1926).
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tended its broad concept of indirect consideration and ruled that the
scheme was illegal. 4
In Safeway, the court reviewed its previous pronouncements on the
broad scope of the constitutional and statutory provisions declaring
lotteries illegal, reaffirmed the broad interpretation developed in the
Society and Danz cases, and set down what was hoped to be the
definitive statement on lottery promotions in Washington State. Ap-
plying the law to the specific facts of the case, the court had no
trouble concluding that a valuable consideration was present in the
bonus bingo promotion.'5
Benefits in the form of increased sales, goodwill and public re-
sponse to advertising of Bonus Bingo amounted to a consideration
valuable indeed to the promoters and supplied the third element,
consideration.
The court further sustained its decision by dusting off some historic
suspicions against lotteries, stating: 16
... laws against lotteries are designed to prevent the public from
wagering their substance upon chance and fortuitous events so
that one cannot be enticed to hazard his earnings on a chance
to win a prize. . . . [Anti-lottery] laws are designed . . . to pre-
clude . . . the promoter . . . from reaping an unearned harvest
at the expense of the players; to prevent the wary from preying
upon the unwary; and to discourage the overly shrewd from
exploiting the natural yearning in most everyone to get something
for nothing, and to put a damper on the actions of those who
receive from the device much more than they part with in prizes.
The court's emphasis on the "inherent evils" of lotteries, when ap-
plied to bonus bingo seem inappropriate when placed in the context
of our highly competitive, Madison Avenue permeated society which
not only accepts spectacular advertising promotions and sweepstakes,
14. Id. at 548-49, 250 P. at 28, where the court stated:
None such [free tickets] were given out as a matter of fact and if there had been,
it would not of itself have made any difference. If in the flourishing days of the
Louisiana lottery its management had advertised that it would give a free ticket to
the president of every bank in the city of New Orleans, that would not have
changed the scheme from a lottery, whether or not any one or all of such free
tickets were accepted.
15. Safeway at 362, 450 P.2d at 955-56.
16. Id. at 363, 450 P.2d at 956 (1969). See also WnmLrms, supra note 4, at 332.
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but presumably enjoys them. It is difficult to see how participation in
bonus bingo would lead to "a substantial loss of earnings," impov-
erishment of the unwary," or an "encouragement of the gambling
spirit."
A more rational basis for the court's decision may be found in the
consumer protection arguments, presented by the Washington State
Attorney General's Office in an amicus brief,17 that games of chance,
such as bonus bingo, constitute unfair trade practices and unfair
methods of competition.' 8 These dangers are apparent: deceptive
advertising techniques have been used to deprive participants of
accurate information relating to their chances of winning, and the
number of prizes available; 19 contests have been rigged, depriving
the participant of any chance of winning;20 large firms .may obtain
an unfair competitive advantage over those competitors unable to
devote large resources to promotional schemes; 2 ' competitive bench-
marks of price and quality of goods and services can be shifted to
promotional "extras;1 2 and the additional costs of these games are
eventually borne by the consumer in the form of higher grocery prices, -2 3
17. Brief for Consumer Protection Division, Attorney General's Office as Amicus
Curiae at 1-3, 30-42. For a more detailed discussion of consumer protection arguments
see notes 18-23 and accompanying text infra.
See also, Washington v. Arden-Mayfair, No. 654850 (King County Super. Ct., Feb.
27, 1967), Washington v. Arden-Mayfair, No. 167486 (Pierce County Super. Ct., Dec.
6, 1965), and White House Market, Inc. v. Nelle, No. 41169 (Whatcom County Super.
Ct., May 11, 1966) cited in Appendixes A, B and C of the Attorney General's amicus
brief in which promotional games of chance, similar to bonus bingo, were held to be
unlawful as deceptive trade practices within the meaning of the Washington State Con-
sumer Protection Act, WASHr. REV. CODE § 19.86.020. None of these cases have been
appealed.
18. For a detailed discussion of these unfair methods of competition and deceptive
trade practices see Trade Regulation Rule, Part 419-Games of Chance in the Food
Retailing and Gasoline Industries, and accompanying Statement of Basis and Purpose
of Trade Regulation Rule, 34 Fed. Reg. 13302 (1969); 2 TRADE Rao. REP. 7975 (1969)
(containing separate opinions of commissioners and other material not printed in Fed.
Reg.). See also 42 WASH. L. REv. 668, 675-79 (1967).
19. 34 Fed. Reg. 13302, 13306 (1969).
20. Id. at 13304.
21. The argument of unfair methods of competition proceeds along these lines: Only
national chain organizations can afford the cost of lavish promotions like bonus bingo.
Thus, corporate giants by means of their superior spending capacities obtain an unfair
advantage over local grocery chains and independent supermarkets. The argument is
unsound. Even if bonus bingo and similar promotions were banned, large chains would
still be capable of paying for more extensive advertising, thus obtaining an "unfair"
advantage over smaller firms.
22. 34 Fed. Reg. 13302, 13307 (1969).
23. Those advocating prohibition or regulation reason that game promoters are not
charitable enterprises and are motivated by profits alone. If Firm A presents a promotion
627
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If the court failed to see these dangers, it should acknowledge them in
the future. If the court consciously disregarded them in favor of the
anti-gambling rationale, it sidestepped the twentieth century problems
raised by these games of chance.
Not only did the court fail to articulate the real policies which its
rule might protect, its definition of consideration was much broader
than that demanded by the facts of the case. Safeway's bonus bingo
required a considerable amount of time and effort on the part of the
participant, even though no purchases were necessary.24 Yet, on the
matter of consideration the court stated: 25
Under our Constitution and lottery statute therefore, one need not
part with something of value, tangible or intangible, to supply the
essential consideration for a lottery. He may, in order to secure
a change to win a prize awarded purely by lot or chance, supply the
consideration by his conduct or forebearance which vouchsafes
a gain or benefit to the promoter of the scheme. The benefit or
gain moving to the one need not be the same as the detriment to
the other. Consideration for a lottery may be both gain and detri-
ment or one without the other. (Emphasis added.)
costing the firm $1,000,000 or more, it hopes to more than pay for the scheme with
increased sales and profits. When competitors B, C, and D are forced to follow suit
(assuming equal appeal to consumers), the likely result will be increased advertising
costs to all firms with no appreciable gain in business to offset these expenditures. The
net effect is higher prices to consumers.
Store owners argue that promotions are simply another form of advertising, that if
bonus bingo is prohibited, the money will simply be spent on other advertising promo-
tions. Thus, consumer prices will not decrease even if the games are prohibited. See
Safeway, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d at 355, 450 P.2d at 952 where it is stated:
Bonus Bingo did not, according to the agreed facts, affect the quality or prices of
Safeway's merchandise or otherwise alter its merchandising policies.
24. Saleway, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d at 352-55, 450 P.2d at 951-52.
25. Id. at 361, 450 P.2d at 955.
This broad contractual theory of consideration as a necessary element in lottery pro-
motions has been favored by a majority of courts. WiLnAMs, supra note 4, has compiled
an extensive list of all lottery cases in his 1956 Supplement. His tally reveals that 65 of
89 cases recorded to 1956 have accepted the broad contractual theory of consideration
set down by Safeway. More recent decisions in accord with this proposition include:
State v. Eckerd's Suburban, Inc., 53 Del. 103, 164 A.2d 873 (1960); Midwest Television,
Inc. v. Waaler, 44 Ill. App. 2d 401, 194 N.E.2d 653 (1963); Blackburn v. Ippolito, 156
So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1963); Boyd v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc., 115 Ga. App. 628, 155
S.E.2d 630 (1967); Idea Research v. Hultman, 256 Iowa 138, 131 N.W.2d 496 (1964).
However, there is a body of case law which adheres to a more stringent pecuniary
notion of consideration as an element of a lottery promotion. In addition to the 24
pre-1956 cases cited by Williams, decisions agreeing with this narrower view since 1956
include: California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp. of Fresno, 50 Cal. App.
2d, 330 P.2d 778 (1958); Cudd v. Aschenbrenner, 233 Ore. 272, 377 P.2d 150 (1962);
People v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., 31 Ill. 2d 535, 202 N.E.2d 473 (1964); Maine v.
Bussiere, 155 Me. 331, 154 A.2d 702 (1959).
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The court apparently disregarded the specific language of the Wash-
ington anti-lottery statute, R.C.W. 9.59.010, which states that persons
must pay or agree to pay a valuable consideration2 0 Under the terms
of the statute, the court was in error when it stated that ". . . one
need not part with something of value, tangible or intangible, to
supply the essential consideration for a lottery."
Furthermore, the court gave only passing notice to defendant
Safeway's contention that since the lottery statute was a criminal
statute, the provision requiring "a valuable consideration" must be
strictly construed.27 Perhaps the court was influenced by the fact that
the case was a civil action brought for a declaratory judgment and an
injunction in which no criminal sanctions were sought.28 Moreover,
prior case law had firmly established a rule of broad interpretation of
the consideration element."9
The court was not required to establish the sweeping rule that it
did in Safeway. Safeway did obtain valuable consideration from con-
ducting bonus bingo. Participants had to read Safeway advertisements
diligently and continuously; they made many visits to Safeway out-
lets; and Safeway sales did substantially increase.3" A direct and
objectionable result of the Safeway decision is that many promotions
which require minor participation (detriments) by customers or obtain
negligible results (benefits) for promoters, are now prohibited.
This conclusion is reinforced by a study of the Sherwood and Roberts
26. See note 1 supra.
27. In D'Orio v. Jacobs, 151 Wash. 297, 302, 275 P. 563, 565 (1929), defendant
sought to recover the purchase price of "Advertoshare" games, relying on the affirmative
defense that "Advertoshare" was a lottery. Holding that "Advertoshare" was not a
lottery, since prizes won were based on the skill of a checker player, the court com-
mented on the lottery statute as follows: "This is a penal statute and must be strictly
construed .... ?
Accord, Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Company,
347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954). Commenting on 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1948), a statute prohibit-
ing the broadcasting of any lottery, the Court stated:
If we should give Sec. 1304 the broad construction urged by the Commission, the
same construction would likewise apply in criminal cases. We do not believe this
construction can be sustained. Not only does it lack support in the decided cases,
judicial and administrative, but also it would do violence to the well established
principle that penal statutes are to be strictly construed.
See also Caples v. United States, 243 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
28. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
29. See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
30. Safeway 75 Wash. Dec. 2d at 355, 450 P.2d at 952.
629
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-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach3 decision in which the Washington Supreme
Court held that a referral selling scheme was a lottery, and therefore
illegal. The Sherwood court enunciated a broad definition of the
element of chance necessary in a lottery promotion, stating that
"[c]hance within the lottery statute is one which dominates over skill
or judgment."" The court continued:"
...chance permeates the entire scheme .... [There was] a
chance that the referrals might not be interested; that the sales-
man might not adequately make his presentation; that the referral
might have already been referred by someone else; that the
market might be saturated; and that the salesman might not even
contact the referral.
It is clear from this case that "chance" includes virtually any kind of
chance, not just the old lottery definition of a drawing by lot.
Sherwood and Safeway have expanded the lottery concept far beyond
the traditional notion of a gambling lottery and even beyond pro-
motional games which prey on the consumers who are duped into be-
lieving that they may be getting something for nothing. Examination
of four common advertising promotions may suggest the scope of the
broad definitional pronouncements in Sherwood and now Safeway:
(1) Firm A distributes a mailer to "occupants" indiscriminantly.
The mailer contains a stamped return envelope announcing a drawing
for a prize. All customer B must do is sign the card and drop it in a
mail box. A lottery? Probably so under Safeway. It may be reasoned
that the customer suffers a "detriment" in signing his name and mailing
a card. Alternatively, firm A is certainly receiving a "benefit" by
getting a new name for its mailing list.
(2) Store C advertises an item at a sharply reduced price with the
caveat-"limited quantity available." A lottery? Quite possible under
Safeway. There is a prize34-- merchandise available at a greatly re-
duced price; since there is only a limited quantity available, there is
only a "chance"" that the customer will be one of the first in line; and
31. 67 Wn. 2d 618, 409 P.2d 160 (1965), noted in 42 WAsr. L. REv. 668 (1967).
32. Id. at 622, 409 P.2d at 163.
33. Id. at 623, 409 P.2d at 163.
34. "Prize," as defined in WAsH. REV. CODE § 9.59.010, supra note 1, is "a distribu-
tion of money or property."
35. A detailed discussion of the "chance" element in lottery schemes is found in
630
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there is consideration-a benefit to the entrepreneur in increased sales,
and/or a "detriment" to the participant who must drive to the store
and be exposed to the sales pitch of the retailing firm.
(3) Firm E, as an added inducement to its customers, advertises
that it will be having a drawing for a free ski weekend for two. All
the individual is required to do is "just fill out the coupon below and
drop it in the box at store E." Of course, no purchase is required.
Under the Safeway decision, this promotion is a lottery, and the
store owners are theoretically punishable by a fine, imprisonment or
both."'
(4) Firm X advertises a free weekend for two in Europe. Customer
B must purchase the product manufactured by Firm X, but must also
write in ten words or less why he considers the product to be superior.
This promotional advertising scheme would not be a lottery because the
element of skill preponderates over that of chance, and thus, a neces-
sary element of the lottery scheme is absent.37
In sum, the result of the Safeway decision is a total prohibition of a
wide range of promotional devices which do not even remotely resemble
the traditional lottery.
Furthermore, the decision, although analytically deficient, has been
accepted in practice by the major retailers. 8 Gas stations and national
supermarket chains no longer promote games of chance within the
State of Washington."9 National promotional games are rarely dis-
tributed within the State, but, when they are, they ordinarily state on
Sherwood and Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wn. 2d 618, 409 P.2d 160 (1965)
(discussed in text accompanying notes 31-33 supra). From this case's broad interpreta-
tion of chance, it is conceivable that the "chance" of not being present at Firm C in time
to purchase the advertised limited quantity item would qualify as an element of lottery
promotion.
36. See WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.59.010 (1956), supra note 1. See also WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 9.59.020-.040 (1909) which define various aspects of lottery promotions as
gross misdemeanors.
37. See note 27 supra on the distinction between skill and chance.
38. The Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney General's Office reports
general compliance with the Safeway decision and the Division is pleased with the atti-
tude of both consumer and business establishments in their acceptance of the lottery
prohibition. However, there is still a great problem among small chain and individually
owned businesses. Owners of these establishments do not realize the broad sweep of the
Safeway decision and do not fully comprehend that their advertising practices are now
illegal. Interview with Christopher T. Bayley, Deputy Attoiney General, Chief, Con-
sumer Protection and Anti-trust- Division, and James M. Kennedy, Assistant Attorney




the entry blank "offer subject to all federal, state and local laws and
regulations" or "Naturally, the sweepstakes is void where prohibited
by law."40 Even local television stations, wary of possible violations,
are voluntarily broadcasting "void in Washington State" disclaimer
notices during lottery-type daytime quiz shows.4 But problems persist
in relation to advertising practices of individual and small chain store
operators.42
Assuming that there are valid reasons4 3 for legal control of schemes
like bonus bingo, it is important to decide whether or not prohibition
of promotional games is the best solution. Proponents of the prohibition
technique reason that prohibition is the simplest, most direct method
of ridding our society of these schemes; no special bureaus or boards
need be established to peruse irregularities when a practice is declared
illegal; deceptive promotional devices and unfair methods of competi-
tion will cease.44
However, there are advantages to a regulatory approach. In addition
to giving the consumer a more informed basis on which to determine
whether or not he will participate, the regulatory method hits at the
real evils of these games of chance, i.e. unfair competition and de-
ceptive advertising. Regulation is also more consistent with our free
enterprise system of open competition in that it does not foreclose all
legal use of this particular type of advertising promotion. Finally, the
definitional elements of prohibited practices could be established by
administrative rules aimed at specific abuses in order to give both
businessmen and law enforcement agencies adequate guidelines to
control their activities.
Detailed regulation of games of chance is provided for in a rule
40. See, e.g., Goon HOUSEKEEPING, Nov. 1969, at 249; LooK, Nov. 4, 1969 at 67.
But see, Loox, Oct. 7, 1969, at 62 where no statements regarding state laws are men-
tioned.
41. KING-TV, the NBC affiliate station in Seattle, inserted the disclaimer on the
following shows: "Personality," "Jeopardy," "You Don't Say" and "The Match Game"
during the spring and summer of 1969. These shows included a home participation aspect
in which television viewers were asked to send a postcard to the station to be eligible
for prizes to be given on the show. Coincidentally, all quiz programs with this home
participation gimmick have been dropped from the NBC fall 1969 daytime schedule.
Interview with Bill Hall, Operations Manager, KING-TV, Seattle, Washington, October
13, 1969.
42. See note 38 supra.
43. See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
44. 34 Fed. Reg. 13302, 13307 (1969); 2 TRADE REG. REP. f 7985 at 12963 (dissent).
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recently adopted by the Federal Trade Commission 5 The rule re-
quires game promoters to disclose on all of the game pieces the exact
number and value of prizes available; the odds of winning each prize
(to be revised weekly if a game extends beyond thirty days); the
category, the total number of game pieces distributed, the number of
outlets participating; and the scheduled termination date of the game.
Promoters are also required to post these details in each retail outlet
and to furnish the Commission with a list of prize winners by prize
category, the total number of game pieces distributed, the number of
prizes made available and the number of prizes awarded.
Some states have enacted legislation to remedy specific abuses in
promotional games of chance. In Michigan 0 and in New York,"
statutes are specifically directed at supermarket and gasoline station
promotions. These laws require disclosures by game promoters similar
to those prescribed under the FTC Rule to enable the consumer to
45. The Trade Regulation Rule, supra note 18, adopted in 1969 by a four to one vote,
is printed in full in 34 Fed. Reg. 13302 (1969).
Evidence and testimony presented to the Federal Trade Commission did not reveal a
unanimity of support for the regulatory approach. 34 Fed. Reg. 13307 (1969). Commis-
sioner Elman, in a dissenting opinion (2 TRADE Gao. REF. ff 7985 at 12963), vehemently
opposed adoption of the Trade Regulation Rule, describing it as an "empty gesture,"
"unenforceable" and "not in the public interest."
The Commission concluded its report thusly:
The rule we adopt today is intended to correct the promotion and employment
in a deceptive manner of games of chance. The proper function of a regulatory
agency is to correct, by regulation if possible, unlawful activity rather than to
prohibit the device altogether. It is possible that this rule will not have the intended
results, or that compliance with it may not be forthcoming. Perhaps this industry
may not be susceptible of regulation. In that event, the Commission to protect the
public interest, will consider imposition of a stricter, prohibitory rule. In any event
the rule announced today will be reconsidered by the Commission 18 months
following its effective date.
34 Fed. Reg. at 13310.
The scope of this note precludes a detailed discussion of the rationale behind this
new rule. For further information on this subject, see G. AIFA-mmE, Ho0.SrvT AD
CoiovEmroFn (1967); and Symposium: Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Decep-
tive Advertising, 17 KAm. L. REv. 551-651 (1969).
46. MIcH. STAr. ANNt., ch. 28.604 (1) § 750.372a (Supp. 1969). For an interesting
history of Michigan's position on lotteries and the judicial prodding necessary to obtain
this specific legislation see People v. Brundage, 381 Mich. 399, 162 N.W.2d 659 (1968).
47. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 369-g (McKinney Supp. 1969). See also memorandum
comment by Governor Rockefeller on the purpose of this legislation, N.Y. Sessions
Laws, at A-326 (McKinney Supp., No. 6, June 25, 1969).
Since New York State authorizes and promotes a state-wide lottery for the benefit of
its public school system, the New York State Legislature could only have enacted
legislation relating to specific types of lottery promotions-games of chance in the super-
market and gas station businesses.
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make an informed decision as to whether or not he wants to participate.
Florida48 allows games of chance only under certain circumstances.
Wisconsin, while retaining lottery prohibition as the primary tool
of legal control, has adopted both a constitutional and statutory
amendment to define in detail what constitutes "consideration" in a
game of chance. 9 Wisconsin's handling of the lottery problem should
be of special interest to Washingtonians, for the broad, self-executing
Washington State constitutional provision banning all lotteries"0 was
taken directly from the Wisconsin Constitution. Attempting to estab-
lish more feasible legal controls over lottery promotions, Wisconsin
amended its constitution thusly:5
The legislature shall never authorize any lottery or grant any
divorce. Except as the legislature may provide otherwise, to listen
to or watch a television or radio program, to fill out a coupon or
entry blank, whether or not proof of purchase is required, or to
visit a mercantile establishment or other place without being
required to make a purchase or pay an admittance fee does not
constitute consideration as an element of lottery.
A statutory amendment, 2 however, did "provide otherwise" and now
a visit to a mercantile establishment does constitute consideration.
Although the Wisconsin definitional approach does not directly attack
the evils 3 of these promotional schemes, it does give business firms
a clearer idea of what they can and cannot do in the area of games of
chance.
48. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.092 (Supp. 1969). This provision allows licensed businesses
to give away prizes to persons selected by lot if such gifts are conducted as advertising
and promotional undertakings, in good faith, solely for the purpose of advertising the
goods, wares and merchandise of such licensee. No person eligible to receive a gift shall
be required to pay any tangible consideration to or purchase anything of value from
the licensee.
49. WIs. CONST. art IV, § 24. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 945.01(2) (b) (2) (Supp. 1969). For
a recent interpretation of the statutory and constitutional amendments and the potential
conflicts between them see Kayden Industries, Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 150
N.W.2d 447 (1967). See also Mundschau, Wisconsin Lotteries-Are They Legal?, 67
Wis. L. REv. 556 (1967).
50. See note 7 supra.
51. WIs. CONST. art. IV, § 24.
52. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 945.01(2) (b) (2) (Supp. 1969). The statutory amendment
listed most of the constitutional exemptions, but did not list visits to a mercantile estab-
lishment as activities not constituting consideration for lottery purposes. Such visits have
thus been held not exempt from lottery prosecution. Kayden Industries, Inc. v. Murphy,
34 Wis. 2d 718, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967).
53. See text accompanying notes 17-23 supra.
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The Safeway decision is indicative of a legislative vacuum in Wash-
ington. It has been left to the judiciary to develop an elaborate defini-
tion of "lottery." A more appropriate approach to the problem would
be legislative identification of the evils of promotional schemes and
control by enactments aimed at the discreet problems identified. Such
an approach could best be implemented in three steps.
The first step would be deletion of the self-executing provision of
the Washington Constitution 4 which now bans all lotteries. 5
Secondly, R.C.W. 9.59.010, which now defines a lottery, should be
limited by a constitutional amendment, perhaps similar to that enacted
in Wisconsin. 6 This amendment would legalize some promotions which,
under the Safeway case, would be illegal. The amendment should
narrow the definition of "a valuable consideration" in order to prevent
overbreadth in what the statute prescribes.
The final step would be the enactment of a regulatory statute, similar
to the Trade Regulation Rule of the FTC,57 or the New York 8 or
Michigan59 statutes, to control the deceptive trade practices, which
have been the real vice of promotional games. This new regulatory
statute should authorize the Consumer Protection Division of the
Attorney General's Office to control and police such sales promotions
by means of injunctive action or economic sanctions. 0
With these three legislafive actions, Washington can resolve the
lottery problems created by the Safeway decision. The traditional
gambling lottery would still be banned. The twentieth century pro-
motional game of chance would be legalized, but stringently regulated
in order to inform the consumer of the cost he bears by participation.
54. See note 7 supra.
55. See note 8 supra.
Michigan's constitutional provision, MIxcH. CoxsT. art. IV, § 41 states: "The legislature
shall not authorize any lottery nor permit the sale of lottery tickets." When Michigan
enacted specific regulatory legislation on lotteries (see note 46 and accompanying text
supra), no mention was made of a constitutional amendment. But the broad self-
executing label affixed by the Washington courts to the Washington State constitutional
provision (see note 8 supra) distinguishes the Washington predicament from the Michi-
gan situation where the courts have not given such a broad self-executing interpretation,
and thus explains the possible necessity for a constitutional amendment in Washington.
56. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
57. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
58. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
59. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
60. The 1969 Texas legislature enacted such a regulatory provision as part of their
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. art. 5069-10.01(14), (15) (1969).
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Finally, a specific agency interested in protecting the consumer would
be given authority to establish guidelines for all businessmen, and to
institute suit for the prosecution of firms for failure to comply. 61
61. During the 1970 extraordinary session of the Washington State Legislature, Senate
Joint Resolution No. 6 (SJR 6) was introduced to repeal the state constitutional ban
against lotteries. The bill would have amended art. II, § 24 of the Washington State
Constitution, supra note 7, to read thusly: "The state legislature shall never (-rthor=
-,-,,tt t-m)) grant any divorce." SJR 6 passed the Senate, but failed in the
House of Representatives.
A second bill, Senate Joint Resolution No. 6 (SJR 17) would have amended art. II,
§ 24 in a more comprehensive manner:
The'legislature shall never ((.U,'.-a,)-Lt .. ) grant any divorce.
The legislature shall never authorize any lottery, other than (1) a lottery operated
by the state, its political subdivisions, or. their agents solely for the purpose of
raising public revenue; or (2). a lottery which is operated (a) solely by a person,
firm, or corporation engaged primarily in this state in the business of making retail
sales of tangible personal property, and (b) solely for the purpose of providing
an inducement for such retail sales; or (3) a lottery, all proceeds from which are
used exclusively for charitable, educational, historic, or public service purposes, as
such purposes are defined by the legislature.
This bill, SJR 17, was not acted upon during the 1970 Legislative session.
On February 10, 1970, the Senate approved a resolution calling for an interim study
by the Interim Municipal Committee to determine what course the Legislature might best
take to "legally authorize certain lottery and gambling activities." The Seattle Times,
Feb. 11, 1970, § A, at 6, col. 4.
On February 11, 1970, an initiative to remove the constitutional ban against lotteries
was filed with the Secretary of State. Initiative backers must obtain approximately
115,000 signatures by July 3 to have the initiative placed on the November 3 general
election ballot. The Seattle Times, Feb. 12, 1970, § A, at 10, col. 4.
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